



International Maritime Statistics Forum

China's One Belt/One Road-Initiative

- a serious competition for
the maritime industry?

Dr. Jürgen Sorgenfrei
MWP GmbH
April 2018



1. OBOR – BRI background
2. OBOR trade volumes
3. Transport cost comparison
4. Re-routing example
5. Conclusion



Khorgos Rail terminal at
Kazakhstan-Chinese border

- OBOR One Belt – One Road (or: BRI) announced by President Xi Jinping in Kazakhstan in 2013
- More than \$900 billion **already** ploughed into Silk-Road oriented projects, from railways to power plants
- According to ADB, there is a \$8 trillion funding gap for Asian infrastructure through 2020 – half of which is in China
- Beijing planners expect China's annual trade volume with OBOR partners to surpass \$2.5 trillion by 2025
- Long term strategy



- China built up substantial industrial capacity during its construction boom, but with the structural slowdown overcapacity is becoming a major concern, prompting efforts to seek alternative demand sources.
- The significant need for further infrastructure development in many developing countries in Eurasia and Africa present major opportunities that current financing mechanisms, e.g., Bretton Woods institutions, cannot meet. Founding the AIIB Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank in 2016 was one answer to this.
- Beijing has a strong desire to continue strengthening relationships and increasing its soft power with neighbors. Official rhetoric focuses on a “peaceful rise” and becoming a global political power.
- With OBOR, Beijing is creating a unifying framework for the many investment and strategic actions taken in the past (and continuing) and consolidate into a single overarching initiative.

- Infrastructure and facilities: construction of key passageways including **roads, ports, railroads, and civil aviation infrastructure**, linking of unconnected road sections, removing of transport bottlenecks, advancing road safety facilities and traffic management facilities and equipment
- Improved customs clearance and transport facilitation, as well as **energy infrastructure such as oil and gas pipeline construction**
- Cross-border supply networks and **power transmission routes**; regional power grid upgrading, IT cooperation in logistics
- Cross-border optical cables, including submarine optical cable projects, satellite information passageways
- **Industrial parks**, joint manufacturing and R&D, trade cooperation zones
- Financial integration and cooperation including a **stable currency system**, bilateral currency swap and settlements, joint financial regulation



① **Trans-Siberian Corridor**

② **KRU-Corridor**

③ **CTC Caucasus Transport Corridor**

④ **Turkish Corridor**

⑤ **Iran-Black Sea Corridor**

⑥ **Maritime Silk Road to Europe**

CTC Caucasus Transport Corridor		
	Strengths	Weaknesses
Opportunities	shortest distance between CA and Europe	multi-modal concept
	qualified performance record/high reliability	electronic goods declaration (customs)
	fast transit times	one-stop-shopping
	exclusive Caspian Sea access	
	low political risk	
Threats	limited road infrastructure	high security level
	competitive tariff	multiple unloadings / risk of damage
	partly COTIF compliant	low risk of fraud & theft


SWOT-analysis per corridor

1. OBOR – BRI background
2. **OBOR trade volumes** (Europe – Asia only)
3. Transport cost comparison
4. Re-routing example
5. Conclusion




Khorgos Rail terminal at
Kazakhstan-Chinese border

The analysis includes the following countries / regions:




EU28 countries						Asian countries	
Austria	Czech Republic	Germany	Latvia	Poland	Spain	China	Tajikistan
Belgium	Denmark	Greece	Lithuania	Portugal	Sweden	Kazakhstan	Uzbekistan
Bulgaria	Estonia	Hungary	Luxembourg	Romania	United Kingdom	Turkmenistan	
Croatia	Finland	Ireland	Malta	Slovakia		Kyrgyzstan	
Cyprus	France	Italy	Netherlands	Slovenia		Russia	

Trade - EU28 with selected Asian countries incl. Russia - 2002-2016



- CHINA (PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF)
- KAZAKHSTAN
- KYRGYZ, REPUBLIC (ex KYRGYZSTAN->2005)
- RUSSIAN FEDERATION (RUSSIA)
- TAJIKISTAN
- TURKMENISTAN
- UZBEKISTAN


Trade - EU28 with selected Asian countries excl. Russia – 2002-2016



Growth rates excluding Russia:

2016/2002 excl. Russia		
	total %	avr. % p.a.
Import	180%	8%
Export	184%	8%
Total	183%	8%

Significant imbalance between Imports to Asia from EU 28 and Exports from Asia to EU 28.



	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Import	37.1%	42.5%	37.8%	33.7%	25.8%	21.2%	23.2%	41.8%	37.0%	37.1%	42.2%	41.9%	38.7%	40.1%	36.7%
Export	62.9%	57.5%	62.2%	66.3%	74.2%	78.8%	76.8%	58.2%	63.0%	62.9%	57.8%	58.1%	61.3%	59.9%	63.3%



Few product groups dominate the trade

Product Ranking by tons in 2016	k tons 2016	2010 -2016	
		Absolute tons growth	% annual growth
Machinery and transport equipment	16.309	3601	4%
Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials	8.038	1065	2%
Crude materials, inedible, except fuels	6.468	-377	-1%
Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material	6.180	-2096	-5%
Miscellaneous manufactured articles	4.248	618	3%
Food and live animals	3.445	1843	14%
Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes	2.008	477	5%
Chemicals and related products, n.e.s.	1.131	383	7%
Beverages and tobacco	957	-87	-1%
Commodities not classified elsewhere	446	-64	-2%

1. OBOR – BRI background
2. OBOR trade volumes
3. Transport cost comparison
4. Re-routing example
5. Conclusion



Khorgos Rail terminal at
Kazakhstan-Chinese border

Example: Route analysis with quantitative and qualitative criteria.

Final Destination and via Points	Mode /Node Type	Link/ Node	Distance (KM)	Total Distance (KM)	Estimated Time (hr)	Condition /Capacity	Unit Cost (per km/20 ton dry cargo)	Segment Cost	Total Major Route Cost	Total Major Route Time (hours)	Time in Days
Current Condition											
China, Shanghai	Rail	A-B	379	11.670	5	good	1,08	\$ 409	\$ 6.000	262	11
	Border	B	N/A		5	N/A	280	\$ 280			
	Rail	B-C	500		7	good	1,08	\$ 540			
	Rail	C-D	191		3	good	1,08	\$ 206			
	Border	D	N/A		5	N/A	280	\$ 280			
	Rail	D-E	1700		24	operable	1,26	\$ 2.142			
	Border	E	N/A		9	N/A	0	\$ -			
	Rail	E-F	3500		72	operable	1,26	\$ 4.410			
	Border	F	N/A		36	N/A	100	\$ 100			
Rail	F-H	5400	96	good	1,08	\$ 5.832					
China, Qingdao	Rail	A-B	379	11.220	5	good	1,08	\$ 409	\$ 6.000	238	10
	Border	B	N/A		5	N/A	280	\$ 280			
	Rail	B-C	500		7	good	1,08	\$ 540			
	Rail	C-D	191		3	good	1,08	\$ 206			
	Border	D	N/A		5	N/A	280	\$ 280			
	Rail	D-E	1700		24	operable	1,26	\$ 2.142			
	Border	E	N/A		9	N/A	0	\$ -			
	Rail	E-F	3500		72	operable	1,26	\$ 4.410			
	Border	F	N/A		36	N/A	100	\$ 100			
Rail	F-G	4950	72	good	1,08	\$ 5.346					
Almaty, Kazakhstan	Rail	M-O	1734	6.444	54	good	1,08	\$ 1.873	\$ 6.960	196	8
	Border	O	N/A		5	N/A	N/A	N/A			
	Ferry	O-A	1300		55	good	1,08	\$ 1.404			
	Border	A	N/A		5	N/A	N/A	N/A			
	Rail	A-C	863		12	good	1,08	\$ 932			
	Border	C	N/A		10	N/A	N/A	N/A			
	Ferry	C-L	469		12	good	1,08	\$ 507			
Rail	L-P	2078	43	good	1,08	\$ 2.244					



Major Findings:


- Comparison only serious point – to – point and under defined conditions (e.g. for 1 TEU out of 10,000)
- General finding: supply chains including maritime trade are in most cases cheaper compared with rail or road transport
- Coastal region to coastal region up to 30 % cheaper
- Problem: “costs” in rail business don’t exist; just tariffs
- Problem: safety / non-tariff barriers (NTB’s)
- Often heard argument: just-in-time is more important than speed

1. OBOR – BRI background
2. OBOR trade volumes
3. Transport cost comparison
- 4. Re-routing example**
5. Conclusion




Khorgos Rail terminal at
Kazakhstan-Chinese border

Central and Western China energy supply



- **CPEC** China-Pakistan Economic Corridor links western China to the Arabian Sea
- The Port of Gwadar is the final destination of Makaran Coastal Highway
- The Port of Gwadar will be developed as maritime link from China/Kashgar to the Indian Ocean
- Most important for oil



In April 2015 China has won the right to operate Pakistan's Gwadar port for a period of 40 years.




Located right at the mouth of the Persian Gulf, the Gwadar port is just outside the Strait of Hormuz, which is the gateway for about 20 percent of the world's oil.

- China is set to invest \$1.62 billion on further development of the Gwadar project, which includes construction of an eastern expressway linking the harbor and coastline, an international airport, breakwater and nine other projects expected to be complete in three to five years.
- A container terminal measuring 1,200 metres is projected and will soon be built by Gwadar along with a 300-meter-long cargo terminal that can harbor four berths.
- This project will give China access to Gulf countries, and the possibility of building a naval base on the Arabian Sea in future.

- Creating access to Indian Ocean:
 - Gwadar
 - Kyauk Phyu

- Less dependent on Strait of Malacca
 - Piracy
 - Indonesia
 - Vessel size
 - Thailand Canal



1. OBOR – BRI background
2. OBOR trade volumes
3. Transport cost comparison
4. Re-routing example
5. Conclusion



Khorgos Rail terminal at
Kazakhstan-Chinese border

- On the short run = No!
- For the high-volume Far East-Europe trade = not really
- Key target markets for OBOR like CA are already today no maritime markets
- Largest potential for Kazakhstan
- For Africa: huge chances for future export markets, but dangerous ...
- For liquid bulk shipping Arabian Gulf – China = increasingly YES
- For North-European ports = not on the short run, but serious risk potential!
- For South-European ports = chance to act as partner

The Police: Every breath you take, every move you make, every bond you break, every step you take I'll be watching you

Thank you for your attention

Dr. Jürgen Sorgenfrei
MWP GmbH
Große Elbstraße 38
22767 Hamburg
Germany

Tel.: +49 40 39109030

Mobil : +49 170 777 2278

E-Mail: Sorgenfrei@MWP-Hamburg.de

